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THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: REVERSAL OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S POSITION ON PHYSICIAN 
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND THE ENSUING COURT BATTLE 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of death confronts everyone at some point during his life.  
Difficult decisions must be made when the prospect of dying is encountered.  
For example, technological advances have extended life expectancy well 
beyond what was thought possible only twenty years ago.  Grandparents are 
receiving hip replacement surgery, people are overcoming cancer, and the list 
goes on and on.  But, when is enough, enough?  Medicine and technology 
cannot be relied upon to extend our lives forever.  The inevitable will occur 
and that day has become the center of much attention. 
Some individuals do not feel that their lives are worth living, or more to 
the point of this article, that living has become too burdensome.  Intolerable 
pain, loss of autonomy, and negative affects on one’s family weigh heavily on 
individuals as they approach death.  Doctor Jack Kevorkian has said that, “You 
can pass any law against assisted suicide and euthanasia and I will disobey 
it. . .because it is immoral medically. When the law itself is intrinsically 
immoral, there is a greater duty to violate the law.”1  Doctor Kevorkian’s 
statement may represent one end of the spectrum, but it does raise an 
interesting proposition.  Can a terminally ill patient with full mental capacity 
choose to die? 
A person may take his own life without question.  Physician-assisted 
suicide, however, has sparked controversy throughout the world.  After years 
of heated debate, Oregon successfully passed the Oregon Death with Dignity 
Act (the Act).2  The Act permits physicians to prescribe controlled substances 
to qualified individuals so that the individual may take his own life.3  Oregon is 
the only state in the United States, which permits physician-assisted suicide.  
Maine, California, Michigan, and Arizona have all attempted unsuccessfully to 
follow in Oregon’s footsteps.  Amid protests and legal challenges, the Act has 
prevailed to date, yet it now confronts its greatest challenge, the federal 
government. 
 
 1. See The Hemlock Society USA, at www.hemlock.org/changing_laws.htm (last visited 
April 20, 2002). 
 2. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800- 127.897 (1999). 
 3. Id. 
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Attorney General John Ashcroft recently stated that DEA agents are 
required to prosecute physicians in Oregon who perform physician-assisted 
suicides.4  This is a departure from the decision by former Attorney General 
Janet Reno who declared the Oregon Death with Dignity Act did not 
necessitate a federal response.  The day after the pronouncement by Attorney 
General Ashcroft, the state of Oregon filed suit, challenging the ruling.  The 
ensuing court battle questions the purpose and scope of the Controlled 
Substance Act and the validity of Attorney General Ashcroft’s ruling. 
Possessing the requisite standing, Oregon will successfully challenge Attorney 
General Ashcroft’s ruling on the grounds that it goes beyond the scope of the 
Controlled Substance Act and it violates the principles of federalism set out in 
the Constitution and reiterated by President Clinton in a 1999 Executive Order. 
The argument in this Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief 
history of physician-assisted suicide and the Oregon Death with Dignity Act to 
acquaint the reader with a general understanding of the issues on both sides of 
the argument; Part II introduces important and relevant case law; Part III 
discusses the effect of Attorney General Ashcroft’s pronouncement; Part IV 
sets up the arguments on both sides of the current court battle; and Part V 
explains why Oregon will be allowed to continue its practice of physician 
assisted suicide. 
I.  THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 
A. History 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act (the Act), approved by voter ballot in 
1994 and enacted in October 1997,5 legalized physician-assisted suicide for 
competent, terminally ill persons residing in Oregon.6  The Act grants an 
attending physician the authority to prescribe a lethal dose of medication to a 
qualifying patient for the purpose of self-administration.7  A qualifying patient 
must be a capable adult8 with a terminal illness9 who resides in Oregon.10  
 
 4. Memorandum for Asa Hutchinson, Administrator, The Drug Enforcement 
Administration, from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice Press Release 
(Nov. 6, 2001). 
 5. See Attorney General Hardy Myers to Take Legal Action to Protect Oregon’s Physician-
Assisted Suicide Law, Dept. of Justice, available at www.doj.state.or.us/releases/rel110701.htm 
(after the Act was approved by ballot in 1994 it was immediately challenged in the courts.  This 
prompted the Oregon legislature to put the Oregon Death with Dignity Act on the ballot again in 
1997.). 
 6. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800 (1999). 
 7. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.815 (1999). 
 8. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800(3) (1999) (“in the opinion of a court or in the opinion of the 
patient’s attending physician or consulting physician, psychiatrist or psychologist, a patient has 
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Before the physician may prescribe the medication, the Act places a great deal 
of responsibility upon her to guarantee that the patient has made an informed 
and well thought out decision. 
The physician must discuss with the patient, his medical diagnosis, 
prognosis, and potential risks.11  Alternative options, like hospice care and 
comfort care, must also be brought to the patient’s attention.12  These 
safeguards are designed to ensure the patient understands his medical future so 
the best decision regarding that future can be made.  After the physician 
discusses the procedure, all possible alternatives, and Oregon residency is 
determined, a second physician is consulted to confirm that the attending 
physician fulfilled her duties to the patient.13 
If either physician feels it is necessary, the patient may also be referred to a 
counselor14 for a determination as to whether or not the patient comprehends 
the ramifications of his decision.  If the counselor does not believe the patient 
is capable of making an informed decision the patient will not be allowed to 
proceed with physician-assisted suicide.  Finally, the patient is encouraged to 
contact next of kin15 and a waiting period gives the patient fifteen days to 
contemplate his decision before a final decision must be made.16 
The Act was designed to offer individuals an opportunity to take a more 
active role in determining the outcome of their remaining life.  Terminally ill 
patients who feel there is no chance or opportunity for survival, are provided 
the means to end their lives.  The patient receives a medical prescription which 
will end his life, instead of possibly enduring medical procedures that will 
prolong death but inflict greater pain and discomfort.  In essence, the Act was 
initiated to provide terminally ill patients the opportunity to die as they had 
live, with dignity. 
B. Scope and Effect of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act 
 
the ability to make and communicate health care decisions to health care providers, including 
communication through persons familiar with the patient’s manner of communicating if those 
persons are available”). 
 9. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800(12) (1999) (“an incurable and irreversible disease that has been 
medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six 6 
months”). 
 10. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.860 (1999). 
 11. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.815(c) (1999). 
 12. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.815(c)(E) (1999). 
 13. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.815(d) (1999). 
 14. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.825 (1999). 
 15. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.815(f) (1999). 
 16. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.840 (1999) (the patient must be given the opportunity to rescind his 
request for physician-assisted suicide up until and including the day the final decision must be 
made). 
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By implication, the Act has been challenged theoretically on equal access 
grounds.  In 1999, a man diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
requested and received life ending medication from his physician.17  
Controversy surrounded the event when the man had problems taking the 
medication himself.18  Reports indicated that the man’s brother-in-law helped 
him carry out the intended act.19  The brother-in-law remained tight-lipped 
regarding his actions causing people to speculate about how he “helped” the 
dying man.20  Because the body was cremated before an autopsy could be 
performed, no one will ever know for sure the brother-in-law “helped.”21 
Supporters of the Act say “there are no plans to attempt to expand the law 
to allow lethal injections or other means so those with disabilities can access 
the law [but] other’s [say] it is only a matter of time.”22  The fact remains that 
neither active euthanasia, lethal injection, nor mercy killing are acknowledged 
by the Act as acceptable means of physician-assisted suicide.  Furthermore, 
immunity from prosecution is only granted to those physicians complying in 
good faith with the provisions of the Act.23  The Act does not protect 
individuals from illegally assisting an individual’s suicide, nor was it intended 
to.  While the Act is open to challenge from the American with Disabilities 
Act24 no such challenge has created a change in the Act’s original scope. 
A study performed at the University of California in San Francisco, by R. 
Jeffery Kohlwes, designed to evaluate physician responses to requests for 
assisted suicide, showed “that patient requests for physician-assisted suicide 
are a relatively common clinical occurrence.”25  How physicians deal with 
such inquiries differs as much between physicians as it does between states.  
No other state is as progressive as Oregon in terms of allowing physician-
assisted suicide, therefore a comparison cannot be made, but Oregon’s Death 
with Dignity Act has led to 69 Oregonians optioning for physician-assisted 
suicide.26 
 
 17. Diane M Gianelli, Oregon Death Tests Assisted-Suicide Law, American Medical News, 
Apr. 5, 1999, at 10. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.885(1) (1999). 
 24. This subject goes beyond the scope of this article. 
 25. R. Jeffery Kohlwes, Physicians’ Responses to Patients’ Requests for Physician Assisted 
Suicide, THE J. AM. MED. ASS’N, June 12, 2001, at 2838. 
 26. See Oregon Death with Dignity, at http://www.dwd.org/pdf/odwd_report.pdf  (last 
visited April 20, 2002) (data is compiled from 1998-2000 statistics). 
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According to an executive director for Compassion in Dying, the Act is 
working exactly as the intended, without any failures and or abuses.27  In 1998, 
only fifteen individuals accepted physician assistance to end their lives.28  
“Some suggested that the numbers were lower than they otherwise may have 
been because of the cloud in the form of proposed federal legislation – that 
hung over the law for much of the year.”29  Despite the fear that the number of 
people choosing physician-assisted suicide would increase dramatically, the 
number has remained relatively constant. 
In both 1999 and 2000, 27 people received medical assistance to end their 
lives.  In 2000, of those 27, the “median age was 69, and 21 had end-stage 
cancer.  All had health insurance, and 23 were in hospice care before their 
deaths.”30  An inference can be drawn from this data that the majority of 
persons requesting and receiving physician assistance in committing suicide, 
were near the end of their lives in terms of both age and health, and they 
possessed the means to continue receiving treatment via insurance had they 
desired.  This being the case, the system does not appear to be exploiting nor 
taking advantage of persons seeking physician assistance. 
Those opposed to physician-assisted suicide have enumerated a litany of 
reasons detailing their opposition.  The most prevailing concern is that the 
doctor will advocate assisted suicide when she should be acting within the 
traditional guidelines as a healer; this situation would potentially destroy the 
doctor-patient relationship.31  Another fear is that the dual role thrust upon 
doctors would lead to an increase in unnecessary deaths.32  Opponents also 
believe “physician-assisted suicide would lead to a decreased incentive to 
research and develop new methods of providing palliative care and life 
sustaining treatments.”33 
Proponents, on the other hand, advocate physician-assisted suicide for the 
dignity and autonomy it can restore to a terminally ill patient at the end of his 
life.34  They also believe that physician-assisted suicide should be available to 
anyone capable of exercising free choice.35  The foundation of these beliefs is 
 
 27. Diane M. Gianelli, Oregon Suicide Report Contains Some Surprises, American Medical 
News, March 8, 1999, at 9. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. (the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act (H.R. 4006/S. 2151) would have hampered 
physicians from practicing by taking away their DEA license if they performed physician-assisted 
suicides). 
 30. Oregon Suicide Law Used by 27, Drug Topics, March 5, 2001, at 10. 
 31. Rena Patel, Physician-assisted Suicide: Is It Time?, 35 Cal. W. L. Rev. 2, 333 (1999). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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that a patient’s rights should outweigh all other interests.36  For example, when 
first put on the agenda in Oregon, pain and suffering were the two biggest 
reasons for legalizing physician-assisted suicide.37  Yet, of all of the persons 
who died in 1998 from physician-assisted suicide in Oregon, only one of the 
patients said pain control was a concern.  Most cited concerns over loss of 
autonomy or loss of control of bodily function.38 
II.  IMPORTANT AND RELEVANT CASE LAW 
A. Conflict between the States 
Advocates believed that the combination of relatively low physician-
assisted suicides and lack of reported abuses in Oregon would lead to the 
adoption of similar statutes in other states.39  No state has yet adopted anything 
resembling Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act.  Some have tried, but they have 
all failed.  Although Oregon has opened the door to a major shift in health care 
ethics, it has been a constant uphill battle for assisted-suicide proponents. 
Five states did place physician-assisted suicide on the ballot, but each 
initiative failed: Washington in 1992, California in 1993, Michigan in 1998, 
and Maine in 2000.40  Beyond the above states, which put physician-assisted 
suicide to a vote, 24 other states initiated bills that would have legalized it; the 
measure failed in each state.41  State courts have also been less than supportive 
of individuals seeking the same right to physician-assisted suicide as 
experienced in Oregon. 
In Sampson v State, Sampson and Doe, two mentally competent and 
terminally ill persons, challenged Alaska’s criminal statute against physician-
assisted suicide, alleging that their physicians should not be prosecuted under 
the manslaughter statute for helping end their lives.42  The Alaska Superior 
Court granted summary judgment against Sampson and Doe.  The court 
concluded that “the Alaska Constitution’s guarantees of privacy and liberty do 
not afford terminally ill patients the right to a physician’s assistance in 
committing suicide and that Alaska’s manslaughter statute did not violate 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. See The Hemlock Society USA, at http://www.hemlock.org/background.htm (last visited 
April 20, 2002). 
 38. See Death with Dignity, at http://www.dwd.org/fss/impact.asp (last visited April 20, 
2002). 
 39. Diane M. Gianelli, Will Oregon Data Spur Other States to Try Assisted Suicide?, 
American Medical News, March 15, 1999, at 11. 
 40. See Death with Dignity Initiatives, at http://www.dwd.org/law/statutes.asp (last visited 4-
20-02). 
 41. Gianelli, supra note 39, at 11. 
 42. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 89 (Alaska 2001). 
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Sampson and Doe’s right to equal protection.”43  The cry of personal autonomy 
has not been enough to legalize physician-assisted suicide.  Opposition has 
fought advocates of legalized suicide at every turn and to the advocates’ 
dismay, increasingly harder. 
The latest opposition has come in the form of anti-assisted suicide 
legislation.  In two unanimous decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
physician-assisted suicide bans in New York and Washington.44  In Vacco v. 
Quill, the plaintiffs alleged that the ban on physician-assisted suicides violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  The plaintiffs 
challenged the law based upon the premise that physician-assisted suicide was 
comparable to withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.45 
The Court ultimately reaffirmed its position that a distinction exists 
between ceasing medical treatment and assisted suicide as enunciated in 
Cruzan v. Director, MO Dept. of Health.  In Cruzan, the Court concluded that 
“[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from [their] 
prior decisions.”46  The Court’s doctrine enunciating a right to refuse treatment 
is based on the notion that patients have a personal liberty right to freedom 
from unwanted touching.”47 
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court once again held that terminally ill 
patients have no legal right to medical help in committing suicide.48  This 
ruling prevented individuals in Washington from claiming a constitutional 
right to physician-assisted suicide, but it did not adversely affect the Act.  Nor 
did the decision begin to resolve the moral and ethical questions many 
Americans ponder physician-assisted suicide.  Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
wrote that the Court’s decision “permits this debate to continue, as it should in 
a democratic society.”49  In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor insinuated that 
the best result may occur if the debate takes place on the state level.  She noted 
that “States are presently undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of 
physician-assisted suicide and other related issues.”50  In which case, “the . . . 
challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding . . . liberty 
interests is entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States . . . in the first instance.”51 
 
 43. Id. at 95, 100 (both Sampson and Doe died before the case was decided). 
 44. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 45. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 794-99. 
 46. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). 
 47. Id. at 278-279. 
 48. Washington, 521 U.S. 702. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 737 (citing 521 U.S. at 716-718). 
 51. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (Justice 
O’Connor, concurring)). 
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B. Case Law 
For years, the medical profession attempted to prolong life through 
medical means.  Sometimes these efforts kept people alive longer than 
otherwise natural. In 1976, the landmark case of In re Quinlan (Quinlan) 
turned the tide toward accepting death as opposed to prolonging life as long as 
possible.52  Twenty-one year old Karen Quinlan was put on life support by her 
doctors after she stopped breathing; she remained in a permanent vegetative 
state, supported only through the assistance of machines.53  A court battle 
ensued when Karen’s father wanted to remove the machines keeping Karen 
alive.54  Karen’s doctors and the hospital opposed this proposition as 
interfering with medical judgment in route to murder.55 
The New Jersey Supreme Court sided with Karen’s father, holding that 
removal of life-sustaining technology is a constitutionally protected right.56  
The court rationalized that the 14th Amendment would have allowed Karen as 
a competent adult to relinquish her life.57  Unfortunately for Karen, given her 
vegetative state, she could not give her consent to the physician.  Considering 
this situation, the court determined that a legal guardian would also possess the 
right to reject life-sustaining technology for the patient.58  Later courts also 
upheld similar cases on the basis of patient’s informed consent.59  The decision 
in In re Quinlan marked a tremendous victory for end of life treatment.  
Patients were given a larger say in how they were going to be medically treated 
during the end of their lives.  Starting with In re Quinlan, courts began to 
recognize that patients possess an inherent right to consent to any and all 
medical treatment.60  Included in a patient’s right to consent is also the right to 
reject unwanted treatment.  The Court, however, has drawn a distinction 
between patient consent and assisted suicide. 
Fourteen years later, the US Supreme Court recognized In re Quinlan and 
other similar state court decisions in Cruzan v. Director, MO Dept. of Health.61  
Cruzan was In re Quinlan all over again with the exception that Cruzan was 
being tried before the US Supreme Court. Cruzan was in a vegetative state and 
 
 52. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ 1976). 
 53. Id. at 653-655. 
 54. Id. at 651. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 671. 
 57. Id. at 663. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); see In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 
(Minn. 1984). 
 60. Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ 1976). 
 61. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261. 
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received life-sustaining assistance with the help of medical technology.62  The 
Court ruled that Cruzan was able to choose to reject or remove life-sustaining 
assistance if she was competent or if her legal guardian agreed.63  The Court 
did note that it was permissible for the state to require ‘clear and convincing’ 
evidence that the patient would be unable to live without technological 
assistance before removal was permitted.64  The Court affirmed Cruzan in 
1997, but it continued to prohibit assisted suicide. 65 
III.  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S POSITION 
A. Oregon’s Breakthrough 
On June 5, 1998, then Attorney General Janet Reno issued a press release 
detailing the Department of Justice’s position on Oregon’s Death with Dignity 
Act.  The press release stated that “the Department has conducted a thorough 
and careful review of the issue of whether the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) 
authorizes adverse action against a physician who prescribes a controlled 
substance to assist in a suicide in compliance with Oregon’s Death With 
Dignity Act.”66  The Department stated that as long as a physician adheres to 
Oregon law, “adverse action” would not be sought against the physician.67 
The strict guidelines and narrow circumstances under which physicians 
may legally assist patient suicide convinced the Department the state of 
Oregon was not acting in violation of federal laws.68  Further, “the Department 
concluded that the CSA does not authorize DEA to prosecute, or to revoke the 
DEA registration of, a physician who has assisted in a suicide in compliance 
with Oregon law.”69  As long as physicians act in accordance with Oregon law, 
the DEA has no grounds for prosecution; however, should someone stray from 
these particular circumstances, prosecution may be sought.  A few examples 
include: “where a physician assists in a suicide in a state that has not 
authorized the practice under any conditions, or where a physician fails to 
comply with state procedures in doing so.”70 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 262. 
 64. Id. at 261. 
 65. Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (Court held the right to refuse medical treatment did not 
extend to the ingestion of poison). 
 66. Statement of Att. Gen. Reno on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act (on file with author) 
(June 5, 1998). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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B. Setback 
November 6, 2001 marked a dramatic change in the Attorney General’s 
position on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act.  Citing a Supreme Court 
decision, Ashcroft stated federal regulation of controlled substances, may not 
be superceded by state legislation.71  “Upon review of the Oakland Cannabis 
decision and other relevant authorities, [Ashcroft] concluded that the DEA’s 
original reading of the CSA - that controlled substances may not be dispensed 
to assist suicide - was correct.”72  The effect of this ruling would be to strip 
doctors in Oregon of the ability to assist terminally ill patients in committing 
suicide.  Doctors who prescribe federally controlled substances to assist patient 
suicide could have their DEA registration revoked or suspended.73  Revocation 
or suspension of a doctor’s DEA registration prohibits him or her from 
prescribing drugs, effectively eliminating the doctor’s ability to practice 
medicine.74 
Ashcroft’s position would effectively eliminate an Oregon doctor’s ability 
to assist his or her patient in committing suicide by requiring DEA agents to 
police and punish doctors who assist patient suicides by prescribing controlled 
substances.  Oregon was unique in allowing physician assisted suicide.  No 
other state in the entire United States allowed physicians to participate in 
assisted suicides.  Ashcroft knew Oregon would be the only state affected 
when he reversed Attorney General Reno’s position.  What affect does the 
ruling have on Oregon?  Oregon is currently challenging Ashcroft’s decision in 
the federal courts.75 
IV.  THE ENSUING COURT BATTLE 
Attorney General Ashcroft’s press release has raised several legal issues.  
They include: whether Oregon has standing to challenge the Attorney 
General’s position, whether the Controlled Substance Act applies to the current 
situation, and whether federalism is being infringed upon.  Each will now be 
discussed in turn. 
A. Standing 
 
 71. U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 72. Memoradum for Asa Hutchison, supra note 4. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Oregon v. Ashcroft, No. 01-CV-1647, 65-66, (D. Ore. filed Nov. 7, 2001); see 
http://www.dwd.org/pdf/transcript.pdf  (a temporary injunction was issued by the District Court 
of Oregon on November 8, 2001). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 387 
 
Standing is required to litigate in federal court.  Standing is composed of 
three essential elements: an “injury in fact,”76 a “causal connection,”77 and the 
injury complained of is likely to be redressed.78  The injury in fact must be 
“concrete and particularized.”79  That is to say that there must be an invasion of 
a legally protected interest and no citizen suits of general grievance are 
allowed.  The injury in fact must also be “actual or imminent.”80  For the 
causal connection to be satisfied, “the injury must be fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant and not the result of some independent 
action of a third party.”81  In order to be redressable, it “must be likely and not 
speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable Court decision.”82 
The injury Oregon alleges is an intrusion upon its sovereign and regulatory 
interests.  Oregon wants to protect its sovereignty by ensuring that its properly 
enacted state laws remain free from federal encroachment.83 Oregon is also 
fearful that the new position taken by the Department of Justice infringes upon 
state regulatory interests by prohibiting Oregon’s Board of Medical Examiners, 
Board of Pharmacy, and Department of Human Services from duly performing 
their functions.84  Standing was granted in similar situations when existing 
state statutes conflicted with new federal legislation.  In New York v. United 
States, the Court heard New York’s challenge of a new federal law.85  New 
York challenged Congress’ ability to enact a federal law, which set guidelines 
for the disposal of radioactive waste, where New York already had its own 
policy.86  Similarly, in Ohio v. Department of Transportation, “since Ohio 
[was] litigating the constitutionality of its own statute, duly enacted by the 
Ohio General Assembly, Ohio [had] a sufficient stake in the outcome of this 
litigation to give it standing.”87 
This case may look like an example of parens patriae88 but it is not.  On 
the surface, the federal government is merely construing its own statute.  If this 
were the only reason for reconstruing the statute, Oregon would lack standing 
 
 76. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 561. 
 79. Id. at 560. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 562. 
 83. Ashcroft, No. 01-CV-1647, 5. 
 84. Id. at 6. 
 85. New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 86. Id. at 149. 
 87. Ohio v. Dept. of Transp., 766 F.2d 228, 232-33 (1985). 
 88. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447-48 (U.S. 1923) (“[with respect to the citizens of 
a state and] their relations with the federal government . . . it is the United States, and not the 
state, which represents them as parens patriae”). 
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because it cannot inapropriately represent its citizens as parens patriae against 
the federal government.  Underlying the Department of Justice’s position is a 
desire to invalidate the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.  The Attorney 
General’s reversal brings directly into question Oregon’s Death with Dignity 
Act.  Oregon is protecting its interest in the matter to ensure that its law 
remains intact. While newly enacted federal laws often conflict with already 
existing state laws the distinguishing factor here is that the Department of 
Justice is making a complete switch from its previous position of allowing 
physician assisted suicide.  Because the Department of Justice has done a 180 
degree reversal, Oregon should be afforded an opportunity to present its case.  
Ensuring that the Act remains intact is not generalized, nor is it minute.  
Peoples’ lives hang on the decision of the court.  Oregon has a particularized 
injury to allege. 
The causal connection between the complained of injury and challenged 
act need only be ‘fairly traceable.’  As noted above, the Attorney General’s 
new position places the Act in a precarious situation.  If a physician in Oregon, 
adhering to the Act, prescribes controlled substances to assist a patient’s 
suicide, she could now face criminal penalties.  The Act’s new uncertainty 
represents a distinct causal connection.  And, a favorable decision would 
restore certainty and ensure validity in the Act; hence, the injury alleged is 
redressable. 
B. The Controlled Substance Act 
The Controlled Substance Act (CSA) controls the manufacture and 
distribution of controlled substances.89  Each substance is placed into a 
schedule based upon its “medical use, potential for abuse, and . . . dependence 
liability.”90  In order for a physician to handle controlled substances, she must 
be registered with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).91  The DEA requires 
record keeping and places quotas on schedule I and II92 substances to curb 
unauthorized use.93  Civil and criminal penalties are imposed on persons 
failing to strictly comply with the CSA.94  A physician’s DEA registration may 
 
 89. 21 U.S.C.A. § 801-971 (see also U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/csa.htm). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. (Schedule I and II are highly addictive and represent the greatest potential for 
abuse.  Schedule II substance, however, possess some medical usage, while schedule I substances 
possess none.). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 389 
 
also be revoked if she participates in any criminal activities or jeopardizes 
public safety.95 
In discussing the scope of the CSA, Attorney General Reno said, 
“The CSA was intended to keep legally available controlled substances within 
lawful channels of distribution and use.  It sought to prevent both the 
trafficking in these substances for unauthorized purposes and drug abuse.  The 
particular drug abuse that Congress intended to prevent was that deriving from 
the drug’s stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system.  There is no evidence that Congress, in the CSA, intended to 
displace the states as the primary regulators of the medical profession, or to 
override a state’s determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical 
practice in the absence of a federal law prohibiting that practice.  Indeed, the 
CSA is essentially silent with regard to regulating the practice of medicine that 
involves legally available drugs except for certain specific regulations dealing 
with the treatment of addicts.” 
The original ruling of the CSA, which Attorney General Ashcroft 
advocates, is a hard line rule restricting the use of controlled substances for the 
purposes of medical assistance.  Doctors may administer controlled substances 
to reduce the suffering of an individual in extreme pain, but she may not go so 
far as to assist the patient in ending his life.  Ashcroft’s position does nothing 
to address what will become of patients whom suffer with tremendous pain 
despite medical assistance.  Drawing a well-defined distinction between life 
and death is admirable, yet it fails to take into consideration the choice of the 
patient. 
It is true that the patient’s choice can not always be followed.  In U.S. v. 
Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s Co-op, the Court held there was no medical 
necessity exception to the prohibitions set forth in the CSA.96  In 1996, 
California voters initiated a movement hoping “[t]o ensure that seriously ill 
Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical 
purposes.”97  The prohibitions set out in the CSA would no longer apply to 
patients or physicians who fell within the proposed medical necessity 
exception.98  Under the CSA, schedule I controlled substances may legally be 
used in a government approved research project.99  The Court declined to 
create a new exception, stating that “[w]hereas some other drugs can be 
dispensed and prescribed for medical use,100, the same is not true for 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. 532 U.S. 483 (U.S. 2001). 
 97. Id. at 480 (citing Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5 (West Supp.2001)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 490. 
 100. See 21 U.S.C. § 829. 
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marijuana.”101 The CSA does not recognize an accepted medical use for 
marijuana.102 
Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s Co-op is distinguishable from the case at hand.  
The Act does not permit physicians to prescribe schedule I controlled 
substances to patients.  Rather it deals solely with schedule II controlled 
substances.  Schedule II controlled substances possess legitimate medical 
purposes; for example, pain relief.103  The State of Oregon legalized physician-
assisted suicide by a majority vote.  In so doing Oregon has elevated 
physician-assisted suicide to the level of a legitimate medical purpose.  Barring 
a change in legislation, the CSA does not prohibit the use of schedule II 
controlled substances in physician-assisted suicide. 
Furthermore, the Act is well designed and contains several safety 
mechanisms.  An individual can not merely walk in off of the street and 
receive a physician’s assistance in committing suicide.  The patient must have 
an ongoing relationship with doctor, attend counseling sessions, seek a second 
opinion, be determined to be a competent adult, and is encouraged to discuss 
his decision with family and relatives.  The Act does not encourage rash 
decision-making, but fosters patient participation during his medical treatment.  
Patients are given the right to make informed decisions regarding life and 
death every day, why shouldn’t they be allowed to do the same here? 
Attorney General Reno believed that the strict requirements of the Act 
combined with public support elevated the Act to a level, which could not be 
overlooked.  Merely classifying physician assisted suicide as murder 
oversimplifies the issue.  Continually administering pain medication to 
terminally ill patients is not necessarily humane.  If a patient decides that pain 
medication does not help sustain a relatively normal way of life and decides to 
stop accepting the medication, he may eventually die in extreme pain.  The 
patient is left between two alternatives, neither one of which may be appealing.  
With the Act, the patient may ask for physician assistance to end his life.  The 
physician does not administer the medication, but merely prescribes it for the 
individual.  The citizens of Oregon have looked at both sides of this issue and 
determined for themselves that the latter is the most humane approach.  If 
nothing else, the will of the people should not be cursorily overlooked. 
C. Federalism Issues 
An Executive Order issued by President Clinton on August 4, 1999, was 
intended “to ensure that the principles of federalism established by the Framers 
guide the executive departments and agencies in the formulation and 
 
 101. Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s Co-op, 532 U.S. at 491 (2001). 
 102. See 21 U.S.C. § 811. 
 103. Id. 
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implementation of policies.”104  Explicit in the ideal of federalism is the notion 
that local government is best suited to deal with issues falling outside a 
national “scope or significance”105 and States retain any power not prohibited 
by the Constitution nor enumerated to the federal government.106  If the 
national government acts outside its enumerated powers a violation of 
federalism shall occur.107  The Order continues by stating that “our 
constitutional system encourages a healthy diversity in the public policies 
adopted by the people of the several States”108 with an aim to foster “effective 
solutions.”109  Solutions should be achieved through “cooperative effort,”110 
with deference to the State when it’s policymaking authority is affected and the 
“greatest caution” when constitutional issues surface.111 
Article II of the U.S. Constitution vests in the President executive 
Power.112  Executive Power includes the right to issue Executive Orders.  
Executive Power is most effective when issued in conjunction with 
Congressional legislation and weakest when conflicting with Congress.113  No 
Congressional legislation specifically supports President Clinton’s Executive 
Order, but the Constitution expressly states “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”114  The Executive Order 
clearly reiterates the distinction between powers set out in the Constitution for 
the federal government and those for the States.  The Executive Order also, 
indicates that as a matter of policy the federal government should encourage 
diversity amongst the States. 
Considered alongside Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Washington v. 
Glucksberg,115 the Executive Order implies that difficult public policies should 
be left up to the individual States.  And, if the federal government should 
decide to intervene in an area of State diversity, it should do so cautiously and 
with an eye toward cooperation.  Attorney General Ashcroft’s ruling does not 
foster an effective solution to the difficult issue of physician-assisted suicide.  
It disregards the decision Oregon’s citizens made when they twice passed the 
 
 104. Executive Order 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (August 4, 1999). 
 105. Id. at (2)(a). 
 106. Id. at (2)(b). 
 107. Id. at (2)(g). 
 108. Id. at (2)(f). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at (2)(h). 
 111. Id. at (2)(I). 
 112. U.S. CONST. art. II. 
 113. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 114. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 115. Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (stating the proposition that certain public policies like 
physician-assisted suicide should be left to “the ‘laboratory’ of the States”). 
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ballot legalizing physician-assisted suicide.  The ruling also oversteps its 
constitutional bounds. 
In Lopez v. United States, the Court determined that Congress possessed 
the power to regulate three areas based upon the Commerce Clause.116 “First, 
Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.”117  
“Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even 
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.”118  “Finally, 
Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities 
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, . . . i.e., those activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce.”119  Attorney General Aschcroft’s 
ruling is an attempt to regulate an activity which has a substantial affect on 
interstate commerce.  If the federal law has a demonstrable “substantial 
effect”120 the ruling will be constitutional. 
Both Lopez and Morrison illustrate what is meant by a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.  The Lopez Court declined to hold the Gun-Free School 
Zone Act of 1990 constitutional.121  A high school senior was convicted of 
violating the Gun-Free School Zone Act after he knowingly brought a handgun 
into his high school.122  The Court holds that “[the Gun-Free School Zone Act] 
neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the 
possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce.”123  Substantial 
effect requires more than unfounded and far-reaching fear that future students 
will also bring handguns into school, destroying the classroom environment.124  
In a similar case, U.S. v. Morrison, the Court declined to uphold the civil 
remedy provision of a federal rape law.125 
Like the Gun-Free School Zone Act and the federal rape law, Attorney 
General Ashcroft’s ruling does not have demonstrable substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.  The purpose of the Commerce Clause is to regulate and 
foster commerce between the several States.  The ruling does not foster 
commerce and only purports to regulate commerce on its surface.  Even 
assuming the ruling is valid, controlled substances will enter Oregon at roughly 
 
 116. 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
 117. Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)). 
 118. Id. (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern R Co. v. United States, 
222 U.S. 20 (1911)). 
 119. Id. at 558-559 (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 21 (1937). 
 120. Id. at 559. 
 121. Id. at 551. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 563-564. 
 125. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000). 
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the equivalent rate as before, because very few individuals actually choose 
physician-assisted suicide.  If the ruling is regulating anything, it is regulating 
the right to die, which is beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause.  Attorney 
General Ashcroft’s ruling violates the ideas set out within the Executive Order, 
Article II of the Constitution and the Commerce Clause. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the present case, Oregon is challenging a ruling by Attorney General 
Ashcroft, which would permit DEA prosecution of physicians who prescribe 
controlled substances too assist patients in committing suicide.  In order to 
reach the merits of its case, Oregon must show the court that it has standing to 
bring its lawsuit.  Oregon achieves this by alleging infringement upon its 
sovereignty and regulatory interests.  By bringing this suit, Oregon will 
succeed in finding out whether or not the Attorney General’s ruling overrides 
Oregon law.  If it does not, the Act remains intact and the Department of 
Justice is prevented from seeking criminal liability against physicians 
practicing under the Act. 
Proceeding to the merits of the case, the CSA does not prohibit physicians 
from using controlled substances to assist patients in committing suicide.  The 
CSA specifically authorizes the use of schedule II controlled substances to be 
administered to patients suffering from extreme pain and other legitimate 
medical purposes.  When the citizens of Oregon passed the Act, they 
legitimized physician-assisted suicide.  Hence, physicians are acting within the 
scope and guidelines of the CSA when they assist patient suicide. 
Federalism necessitates that the Act be free from egregious federal 
oversight.  The Constitution sets out enumerated federal powers, powers 
prohibited from the states, and places the remaining powers in the hands of the 
states or its people.  Furthermore, the Executive Order by President Clinton 
encourages cooperation between the federal government and state governments 
when difficult policy concerns are at issue.  Attorney General Ashcroft’s ruling 
disregards the boundaries between what the federal government has the power 
to regulate and what should be left to the individual States.  An analogy can 
best be drawn to the death penalty.  States are divided on the issue of 
administering the death penalty.  In fact, of the Western world, the United 
States is practically alone in its practice of the death penalty.  Difficult moral 
concerns have caused States to act in accordance to the wishes of their 
individual citizens.  President Clinton’s Executive Order implies the same 
scenario applies to physician-assisted suicide.  The federal government also, 
cannot claim that it is regulating commerce under the Commerce Clause, 
because what seems to be the real driving force behind the Attorney General’s 
ruling is to invalidate the right to die. 
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In conclusion, the right to die is not a constitutional right, but that does not 
mean it is not a right.  Attorney General Ashcroft cannot stop individuals from 
committing suicide, yet he is attempting to prohibit physician-assisted suicide.  
Is it more humane to prohibit physician-assisted suicide and prolong life by 
administering medication to reduce the amount of pain and suffering one 
undergoes, or is it more humane to allow physician-assisted suicide no matter 
what our moral position is?  I for one could not bear to see a loved one suffer 
through incurable pain, yet I do not advocate physician-assisted suicide.  I 
believe that there must be a better option.  But, that is my choice and someone 
else may make a different decision, as did the voters of Oregon.  The Act does 
not allow every patient to receive physician assistance in committing suicide.  
It requires that a relatively intense and scrutinizing process be carried out 
before any controlled substances are prescribed.  The system has created 
safeguards to ensure that mentally capable adults are making the proper 
decision.  Oregon has withstood countless morality attacks through the legal 
system and in the media during the past four years; it is time that Oregon be 
recognized for taking a leading and progressive viewpoint toward end of life 
care. 
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